How the minister can give ideas to separatists to recast their discourse
POINT OF VIEW BY RIYAZ AHMAD
It is now two weeks since Sham Lal decreed Azadi for Kashmir, statehood for Jammu and union territory status for Ladakh in one of his political speeches in Jammu. The statement followed the predictable trajectory: being first spoken, then being roundly criticized, censured and finally defended by his own party. The minister had to go through quite a rough time but at the end of it sits smug in his job despite the reports to the contrary. However, in the process Lal has not only earned a bit of a fame for himself, albeit incurring also some Congress wrath, but also helped generate some heated debate over the practicability or at the minimum desirability of his ambitious idea about the remaking of the state. Or to call it what it essentially was, a calculated or rather an expedient statement deployed - albeit clumsily - to blunt BJP rhetoric in Jammu. More so, when Panchayat polls are on the horizon. The statement was a deft political move which - had its real import not been dissipated by the controversy - would simultaneously play on the disparate regional aspirations of the state. It sought statehood for Jammu, a long term rightwing agenda there. It also asked union territory status for Ladakh, an ongoing demand there. And finally the statement begrudgingly advocated Azadi for Valley, something that no Congress leader in the state has ever done in the past. But the politician in Lal conceived a catch-all statement that makes all the three regions happy. More so, in Jammu where slogan of Azadi from Kashmir has been such a big draw politically.
However, while the statement may have deservedly generated some political heat, the shock was about the impudence of an ordinary Congress minister to do so rather than any independent value of the Azadi advocacy by him. This is why Lal had fewer takers for his formulation among the separatists who otherwise never lose an opportunity to welcome a favourable comment emanating from any corner of the world. Even the longtime votary among the separatists for trifurcation Sajad Lone was sparing in his appreciation.
However, while separatists have chosen to respond or conspicuously ignore the obvious Azadi and trifurcation dimension of Lal's speech, they - except, of course Lone - have never confronted the less obvious implication of the statement made: the divergence in political aspirations of Kashmir, Jammu and Ladakh. For, separatists as for the mainstream parties, unity of Kashmir is paramount. And when separatists talk of the resolution of Kashmir, it means the entire state. This so even while J&K in its entirety may be India's only Muslim majority state, the concept of majority and minority radically varies in the three regions of the state. While majority communities in Jammu and Leh see themselves at home in India, it is the majority in Valley and in a more subdued way their co-religionists in Doda, Poonch and Rajouri in Jammu and Kargil in Ladakh who are uneasy. This, in turn, has created a situation where not only the three regions plow in different directions but the intra-regional politics in Jammu and Ladakh finds itself bogged down in this contradiction.
On the other hand, there has been a conscious effort to highlight the divisions within the Muslim community itself. Given the obvious cultural and of course religious differences within their ranks, it has been easy to present a fragmented picture of the community. Hence we have handy classifications of Shia, Sunni, Gujjar and Bakerwal with their different worldviews and political aspirations. This makes separatist struggle more or less a Sunni centric phenomenon confined predominantly to urban centres of Valley. Over the years, enough propaganda work has been invested in this theory that it looks convincing to the uninitiated. But the theory cannot be completely brushed away either. The question remains that even if many parts of this Kashmir story are motivated and constructed, it is a story nevertheless. And also credible in many parts. Has any major separatist group in the state taken this on board. Beyond a lip service, never. They have chosen to take refuge in the absolute historical dimensions of Kashmir problem with its roots in the competing concepts of the nationhoods of India and Pakistan rather than the ground realities of the state itself. This is why even after 63 years, narrative on Kashmir remains underpinned by the lingering rivalry between India and Pakistan rather than the aspirations of the people of the state. There is little evolved intellectual debate on Kashmir from within. And little interest to understand and acknowledge the complexities of the inter-regional and intra-regional politics in the state.
For separatists, the debate remains firmly locked up in 1947 and thereabouts. They grapple with the answers when confronted with the new realities. Though they would jump to brand the Kashmir struggle as indigenous, their discourse remains non-local and mostly historical. True, Kashmir dispute has its history and an overarching context in partition, but it is long past that stage and now fundamentally blights the people of the state and so in the first place is their problem. But both Hurriyats have chosen to live in history rather than ground themselves in the circumstances of the state. Though they may claim to represent the Muslims in Jammu and Ladakh, they won't share leadership with them. Besides, operating outside the system as they do and hence mostly untouched by the evolving situation in the state, they have hardly felt an incentive to respond to the emerging challenges. This is why, Sham Lal's formulation for a Kashmir solution should give them some ideas. It is time to see Kashmir problem as primarily Kashmir's own problem.
However, while the statement may have deservedly generated some political heat, the shock was about the impudence of an ordinary Congress minister to do so rather than any independent value of the Azadi advocacy by him. This is why Lal had fewer takers for his formulation among the separatists who otherwise never lose an opportunity to welcome a favourable comment emanating from any corner of the world. Even the longtime votary among the separatists for trifurcation Sajad Lone was sparing in his appreciation.
However, while separatists have chosen to respond or conspicuously ignore the obvious Azadi and trifurcation dimension of Lal's speech, they - except, of course Lone - have never confronted the less obvious implication of the statement made: the divergence in political aspirations of Kashmir, Jammu and Ladakh. For, separatists as for the mainstream parties, unity of Kashmir is paramount. And when separatists talk of the resolution of Kashmir, it means the entire state. This so even while J&K in its entirety may be India's only Muslim majority state, the concept of majority and minority radically varies in the three regions of the state. While majority communities in Jammu and Leh see themselves at home in India, it is the majority in Valley and in a more subdued way their co-religionists in Doda, Poonch and Rajouri in Jammu and Kargil in Ladakh who are uneasy. This, in turn, has created a situation where not only the three regions plow in different directions but the intra-regional politics in Jammu and Ladakh finds itself bogged down in this contradiction.
On the other hand, there has been a conscious effort to highlight the divisions within the Muslim community itself. Given the obvious cultural and of course religious differences within their ranks, it has been easy to present a fragmented picture of the community. Hence we have handy classifications of Shia, Sunni, Gujjar and Bakerwal with their different worldviews and political aspirations. This makes separatist struggle more or less a Sunni centric phenomenon confined predominantly to urban centres of Valley. Over the years, enough propaganda work has been invested in this theory that it looks convincing to the uninitiated. But the theory cannot be completely brushed away either. The question remains that even if many parts of this Kashmir story are motivated and constructed, it is a story nevertheless. And also credible in many parts. Has any major separatist group in the state taken this on board. Beyond a lip service, never. They have chosen to take refuge in the absolute historical dimensions of Kashmir problem with its roots in the competing concepts of the nationhoods of India and Pakistan rather than the ground realities of the state itself. This is why even after 63 years, narrative on Kashmir remains underpinned by the lingering rivalry between India and Pakistan rather than the aspirations of the people of the state. There is little evolved intellectual debate on Kashmir from within. And little interest to understand and acknowledge the complexities of the inter-regional and intra-regional politics in the state.
For separatists, the debate remains firmly locked up in 1947 and thereabouts. They grapple with the answers when confronted with the new realities. Though they would jump to brand the Kashmir struggle as indigenous, their discourse remains non-local and mostly historical. True, Kashmir dispute has its history and an overarching context in partition, but it is long past that stage and now fundamentally blights the people of the state and so in the first place is their problem. But both Hurriyats have chosen to live in history rather than ground themselves in the circumstances of the state. Though they may claim to represent the Muslims in Jammu and Ladakh, they won't share leadership with them. Besides, operating outside the system as they do and hence mostly untouched by the evolving situation in the state, they have hardly felt an incentive to respond to the emerging challenges. This is why, Sham Lal's formulation for a Kashmir solution should give them some ideas. It is time to see Kashmir problem as primarily Kashmir's own problem.
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